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C.I.A. STUDY ASSESSES SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Detailed Report Predicts Millions Would Die in Nuclear Conflict Despite Major Program

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 19 — A Central Intelligence Agency report released today says that the Soviet Union has developed an active civil defense program for protecting its population in the event of nuclear attack, but that millions of its people would still be killed in the event of a major war with the United States.

The report does not draw any conclusion concerning Moscow's willingness or ability to attack the United States. It says the Soviet leaders believe that the civil defense program would improve the nation's ability to wage a war against the United States and would "enhance the Soviet Union's chances for survival following a nuclear exchange."

However, the study concludes, "They cannot have confidence in the degree of protection their civil defenses would give them." Consequently, the report goes on, the program is unlikely to embolden the Soviet leadership to risk a nuclear war.

Made Public by Senator Culver

The report was released by Senator John C. Culver, Democrat of Iowa, who is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The general conclusions of the C.I.A. study were reported previously by Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, in Congressional testimony made public in February.

The full study now released is the most comprehensive official assessment of Soviet civil defense yet made available to the public. Its release comes in the midst of a debate within the Government over whether the United States should attempt to match the Soviet civil-defense program. An interagency study is to be completed next month.

The United States has scaled down its effort over the last 15 years and now spends \$100 million to maintain shelters built in the early 1960's. Under a plan now under study in the Defense Department, \$4 billion would be spent over the next five years to improve procedures for evacuating large cities.

Two Views of U.S. Civil Defense

Supporters of a stronger program contend that it would reduce the chance that the Soviet Union might think of using nuclear arms during a severe crisis. Skeptics are concerned that a stronger program on both sides could make a nuclear war more likely by giving leaders the impression that it could be fought and won.

The C.I.A. report is unlikely to resolve the controversy, but it does contain details on the Soviet effort, estimated to cost \$2 million a year.

According to the report, the Soviet Union can provide shelters for "virtually all the leadership elements at all levels," or about 110,000 people. It also says that 12 to 24 percent of the total work force of key economic installations could be protected against nuclear attack.

Speed of Evacuation Is Critical

It says that a critical factor in determining whether large numbers of the population as a whole would survive is whether cities could be evacuated before a nuclear attack. According to the report, evacuations may take as long as a week for larger cities.

The report, analyzing a hypothetical American nuclear strike, concludes that "under worst conditions" more than 100 million deaths would result in the Soviet Union. Under the most favorable conditions, it says, civil defense could reduce casualties to "the low tens of millions."

In releasing the report, Senator Culver called for a review of American civil defense efforts "to see whether they can be improved and strengthened." However, he said the Soviet programs "were not enough to tip the strategic balance" and warned against starting a "crash program that would represent a radical change from our existing programs."

20 July 1978

A-war 'too risky' for Russ, CIA finds

WASHINGTON [AP]—A CIA analysis of the Soviet civil defense system concludes that it does not provide sufficient protection to encourage the Soviet Union to risk starting a nuclear war, Sen. John Culver [D., Ia.], said Wednesday.

Releasing the unclassified study, Culver said it demonstrates that Soviet civil defense efforts "are not sufficient to prevent millions of casualties and massive industrial damage in the event of a nuclear war."

"In short, Soviet programs are not enough to tip the strategic balance against us."

Critics of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] now under way by the United States and the Soviet Union as a factor that would give the Soviet Union an advantage over the United States in a nuclear exchange.

CULVER, WHO IS emerging as a leading defender of the Carter administration position in the SALT negotiations, called a press conference to counter the claims of SALT critics.

"Despite widespread claims that Soviet leaders might launch a nuclear attack because they expect to suffer only moderate damage and few casualties—and we hear that suggested today in a number of quarters—the professional judgment of our intelligence community is

that they would not be emboldened to expose their country to a higher risk of nuclear attack," said Culver.

The senator contended that even under the worst conditions for the United States—assuming it had been struck by a Soviet nuclear attack inflicting 100 million casualties—the U.S. retaliatory strike would devastate the Soviet Union and kill more than 100 million people.

"SUBSTANTIAL POPULATION protection requires evacuation" from major urban centers, said Culver, and such a move by the Soviets in advance of an intended attack on the United States would remove the essential element of surprise.

The CIA report on Soviet civil defense noted that "programs for the protection of the leadership are solidly established and well advanced" and that there continues to be emphasis on construction of blast shelters in urban areas.

The study also concluded that Soviet leaders believe civil defense improves their ability to fight a war and survive a nuclear attack, but that they have considerable doubts about its effectiveness.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
20 July 1978

Russians' Civil Defense Seen Not Effective Enough for War

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet population is not protected from attack to the extent that the Kremlin could logically regard nuclear war as a risk worth taking, the Central Intelligence Agency said in a report released yesterday.

The CIA, while acknowledging that Soviet civil defense preparations have been intensifying since the "late 1960s," concluded that the Russian program has many of the shortcomings of our own, including "apathy" by a large segment of the population.

To make a nuclear war thinkable, the agency said, Soviet planners would have to evacuate their people to protect them from an American counterattack. But such an evacuation would have to take place days before Soviet missiles were launched, the CIA said, eliminating the element of surprise.

In summing up whether defenses are effective enough to make Soviet leaders believe nuclear war with the United States could be a winning proposition, the CIA said, "We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the U.S.S.R. to a higher risk of nuclear attack."

Sen. John C. Culver (D-Iowa), in a news conference, termed the CIA report "the first comprehensive and authoritative analysis" of the Soviet civil defense program to be made public.

Its key finding, he said, is that the expanded Soviet civil defense program does not "adversely affect the strategic balance" between the United States and Soviet Union.

Some arms specialists have been arguing that the Soviets' improved defenses against nuclear attack, including protecting their leaders, workers and vital industries, indicate that the Kremlin is preparing to wage and survive a nuclear war with the United States.

These were other findings in the CIA's 16-page report:

- The Soviet civil defense program "is not a crash effort, but its pace increased beginning in the late 1960s" and now involves a bureaucracy of "over 100,000 full-time personnel."

- "A sustained effort has been made to provide blast shelters for the leadership and essential personnel, about 110,000 people," but there have been no "significant" attempts to disperse industry nor make existing factories harder to destroy with nuclear weapons.

- About 12 to 24 percent of Soviet workers "at key economic installations" could be fit into existing bomb shelters, while 10 to 20 percent of the total city population could be protected from nuclear attack.

- "Over 100 million" Soviet civilians would die from a U.S. nuclear retaliatory attack made under the "worst conditions for the U.S.S.R." but "a large percentage" of Soviet leaders would survive.

- "Under the most favorable conditions for the U.S.S.R., including a week or more to complete urban evacuation and then to protect the evacuated population, Soviet civil defenses could reduce casualties to the low tens of millions."

- Although many of the workers in bomb shelters would survive, "the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to their economy and the destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments."

- The CIA, in arriving at those conclusions, assumed that the United States counterattack would focus on factories and military installations, rather than on the Soviet population.

- Culver, chairman of the Senate Armed Services subcommittee, which oversees the U.S. civil defense program, said that the United States could kill even more Soviet civilians, if there were any reason to do so, by using "dirtier" H-bombs than those now deployed and by zeroing in on the civilian population.

- The Pentagon, in response to the Soviets' stepped-up civil defense effort, is considering a more ambitious undertaking, which Culver said could cost \$2 billion over five years. The CIA estimated that it would cost \$2 billion in 1976 dollars to duplicate the Soviet civil defense program in existence that year.

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.


July 20 1978

Lyle L. Miller,
Acting Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505


Sir:

The attached communication
is sent for your consideration.
Please investigate the statements
contained therein and forward me
the necessary information for re-
ply, returning the enclosed corre-
spondence with your answer.

Yours truly,



Lionel VanDeerlin, M. C.
Member of Congress



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SAINT ANDREW'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH
4816 GLEN STREET
CORNER OF LEMON AVENUE AND GLEN STREET
LA MESA, CALIFORNIA 92041

PHONE (714) 469-5611

THE REV. CHARLES RICHMOND, RECTOR
460-7272

July 18, 1978

*The Honorable Lionel VanDeerlin,
815 E Street
San Diego, California 92101*

Dear Mr. VanDeerlin,

*As my representative in our federal government,
I ask that you read the enclosed article by Mr. Jack
Anderson and let me know if this is true. I hope your
answer will be in the negative. May I hear from
you as soon as reasonably possible?*

Very sincerely yours,

The Reverend Charles Richmond

*CR:ms
Enclosure*

CIA trained Amin's henchmen in Georgetown



WASHINGTON — Washington's elite Georgetown enclave, with its expensive townhouses, seems a strange training ground for cutthroats who have helped dictator Idi Amin put to death hundreds of thousands of his Ugandan subjects.

Yet we have learned that the Central Intelligence Agency recruited at least 10 of Amin's handpicked henchmen for special police training in a strange "prep school" that the American taxpayers established in the exclusive confines of Georgetown.

These Ugandan police and intelligence agents attended the International Police Academy, ostensibly operated by the Agency for International Development, but secretly supported by the CIA. They returned to Uganda to torture and execute Amin's victims.

The academy was located in an old streetcar repair center in Georgetown, not far from the gardened dwellings, where such Washington eminences as Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger and John F. Kennedy have resided. More than 5,000 police agents from 77 governments received training in "the Car Barn" before the operation was closed down under congressional criticism in 1975.

Three of the Ugandans went on to take a post-graduate course at the International Police Services, Inc., another school hidden away in a Washington brownstone mansion. The school operated as a commercial cover for the CIA for more than a quarter century and exported police equipment to foreign governments paid for covertly with CIA money.

In addition, the CIA had a full-time police instructor stationed in Uganda in the early days of Amin's regime, and a CIA liaison officer was posted there until the United States closed its embassy in 1973. His duty was to exchange information with the psychotic dictator's police and intelligence officials.

Shockingly, the Ugandan contingent was brought to this country and trained at Georgetown long after Amin's murderous policies were evident. His victims, indeed, included some Americans.

As far back as July 1971, two Americans were hustled off to a Ugandan military camp from which they never returned.

According to reports, they were spread-eagled over inflammable oil drums, which were set ablaze by tracer bullets fired by Amin's executioners. Their burned bones were dumped into a river by a lieutenant who later signed an affidavit. The officers responsible for the atrocity were later promoted by Amin.

In 1974, we also reported that some of the foreign students at the police academy had written papers favoring torture tactics. The school's administrators denied, however, that torture techniques were taught.

One of the Ugandan graduates was J. Bigirwa who went home to work for Uganda's dread Public Safety Unit which carries out Amin's murder orders. We have also learned the names of other CIA-sponsored trainees from Uganda who later held powerful police or intelligence posts under the bloodthirsty Amin. They include:

— Gerard O. Malinga. He was an assistant commissioner of police. After his U.S. experience, he was promoted to the Public Safety Unit, which is widely involved in carrying out Amin's genocide against his own people.

— Joseph Wambua Peter. He is now an investigator for the Ugandan Criminal Investigations Division, known for its brutal interrogations and for arresting innocent Ugandans in the middle of the night for trivial offenses.

— Charles Frederick Sseruwo. He is currently believed to be a police officer in the Ugandan government.

— John Walusana. A former police officer, he was promoted by Amin to be governor of a province, but later lost favor with the dictator. He is now believed to be in hiding from his former Georgetown colleagues.

A spokesman for the CIA refused any official comment on the Ugandan police training. But we did elicit the unattributed comments of several at the agency who knew about it. "By training Amin's men," one CIA official explained, "we were able to have some influence over the elite in that country and thus have some influence over Amin. It was also a possibility that we could go back to the trainees later for influence." If the purpose was to influence Amin, it has failed.